The flexibilities introduced in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement were aimed at providing the developing countries with the option to adopt suitable measures to address access to patent-protected pharmaceutical products. The flexibilities include the grant of compulsory licences, exceptions to the exclusive right conferred by patent, allowing for parallel imports, and defining the criteria of patentability to achieve the goal of public health. While these flexibilities are available to all developing countries, only a few have implemented the flexibilities into their patent legislation. This paper examines the TRIPS compliant patent laws introduced in Brazil in the post-TRIPS era. It will be argued that the TRIPS Agreement was implemented too soon in Brazil, and the TRIPS flexibilities, although available had not been fully utilised due to pressure from transnational pharmaceutical corporations backed by developed countries, fear of exclusion from major trading blocs, and also due to a gap in the knowledge economy. It will also be argued that the World Trade Organization did not create a level playing field in the TRIPS negotiation in the lead up to the entry into force of the Agreement in 1995, which effectively handed over the advantage to the developed countries, thereby creating a two-tier system in the intellectual property rights arena and making it impossible for developing countries and least-developed countries to achieve the objective of access to affordable medicines.
Introduction
Patent rights fall under the broad spectrum of intellectual property (IP) rights and have a very high commercial value in a consumer-driven economy, where rights holders seek to enforce their rights globally. Patent right is a monopoly right granted to a person who has invented a new and useful product, which prohibits the unauthorised exploitation of the patented product by third parties. 1 The justification for an exclusive monopoly right is strongly predicated on the premise that rewarding the inventor for the skill and effort expended will encourage innovation, although no clear evidence is available to lend support to this rhetoric. 2 Some have argued that conferring monopoly rights on life-saving drugs should be excluded from the purview of patent laws, as it leads to the abuse of the monopoly by the patent holders. The current study is concerned with international pharmaceutical patent rights protection and the response of Brazil, a developing country, to the implementation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) flexibilities into its national legislation. The laws and the allied policies of Brazil are chosen for the study, as the country falls under the category of a developing country, 3 and for also being seen as potential growth markets by the global pharmaceutical industry. Brazil presents an ideal choice for study of TRIPS compliant legislation and TRIPS flexibilities implementation, due to its socio-economic conditions, and also due to its historical background in just having emerged from over two decades of military rule in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Brazil, one of the BRIC economies 4 along with Russia, India, and China, has the domestic need and necessity to implement the flexibilities, as a large number of its population is in dire need of generic medicines (for instance, antiretroviral (ARV) drugs for HIV/AIDS) for frontline treatment, apart from the requirement to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. There is also clear evidence that Brazil has implemented the TRIPS flexibilities to meet both its domestic need and international commitments.
The study will present the opportunity to analyse the rationale behind the specific provisions of the TRIPS compliant patent legislation, shedding light on the socio-economic and legal needs of Brazil, and raise the query if external factors, such as free-trade agreements (FTAs), pressure from multinational pharmaceutical corporations backed by developed countries, and political pressure from developed countries, had influenced the implementation and the legislative process. The study will also analyse if the measures taken in response to the TRIPS' requirement had improved the conditions on the ground, and if it had facilitated and, or improved access to affordable medicines to demonstrate the objectives and promise made under the TRIPS Agreement. This paper is organised into four parts, with the first part providing the introduction, and the second part presenting a contextual analysis of TRIPS Agreement, its genesis, and the introduction of flexibilities into the Agreement. The third part presents the country-specific analysis of TRIPS flexibilities implemented into the national legislations, and the fourth part considers the outcomes of the analysis and concludes the study. The fourth part will also suggest such ways to address the inequalities in access to affordable medicines created in developing and least-developed countries (LDCs) through the introduction of an international IP rights regime. negotiated in the colonial era. 12 Developing country concerns about international IP regulations started to emerge only in the post-colonial era, culminating in a North-South standoff on reform of the international IP system in the 1970s and 1980s. 13 It is to be borne in mind that the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated at a time when there was a deadlock between developed countries on the one hand, and developing countries and LDCs on the other hand over the revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, before the WIPO.
14 Also, a number of developing countries that sought membership at the WTO were not granting patent monopolies for pharmaceutical products 15 at the time when the Uruguay Round 16 of negotiation was taking place.
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Developing countries, led by India, Brazil, and Argentina, were strongly opposed to the proposal as they were of the firm view that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) mandate did not allow for the discussion of substantive issues on IP, and that it was the WIPO that had the institutional competence to discuss such issues. 18 In July 1989, India, one of the developing countries, submitted a detailed paper at the negotiations expressing the developing countries' strong opposition to the inclusion of IP rights to the GATT agenda. 19 Although the paper presented by India at the negotiations was debated, 20 it did not have the desired effect, as towards the latter half of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 almost all developing countries were constrained to change their position on the inclusion of IP rights to the GATT agenda. 21 With little or no opposition from the UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 10) 7. India had all along argued that any principle or standard relating to intellectual property rights (IPRs) should be carefully tested against the needs of developing countries, and that it would be inappropriate to focus the discussions on the protection of the monopoly rights of the owners of IP, when almost 99% of the patents were owned by industrialised nations. It urged that the group focus on restrictive and anti-competitive practices of the owners of IP rights and evolve standards and principles for their elimination to avoid distortion of trade. It also stressed that substantive standards on IP were more in the realm of socio-economic, industrial and technological development, especially in the case of developing countries. 21 The shift came about due the coercive strategies adopted by the USA, and as a result India found itself isolated in the negotiations. RC Bird and DR Cahoy, 'The Emerging BRIC Economies: developing countries at the negotiations, 22 the debate on the inclusion of IP rights into the GATT agenda came to an end, paving the way for the entry of the TRIPS Agreement. 23 2.1. TRIPS flexibilities and the implementation game There was a growing concern among the developing countries that the IP right standards sought to be introduced through the TRIPS Agreement could severely restrict access to essential medicines 24 for their citizens and also impede their efforts to control diseases, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Some feared that the extended IP rights protection for pharmaceutical patents was likely to increase dependency on multinational pharmaceutical companies and affect the developing countries and LDCs severely, as essential medicines will become unaffordable and beyond their reach. The developing countries' position was that the TRIPS Agreement did not limit their sovereign powers when addressing domestic health crises, such as HIV/AIDS, while developed countries like the USA and Switzerland (both holding a number of pharmaceutical patents) assuming the stance that the only flexibility afforded under the Agreement was its staggered implementation in certain cases. 25 Against this backdrop, the Council for TRIPS 26 agreed to deal specifically with the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and public health in developing countries.
In June 2001, for the first time, the Council for TRIPS considered in detail the relationship between public health and TRIPS, 27 which to some degree helped to move in the direction of a special declaration on the subject. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Access to essential medicines is recognised as an indispensable part of the right to health and is viewed as a non-delegable obligation on the part of the State, and cannot be violated based on lack of available resources. 'The Selection and Use of Essential Medicines' WHO Technical Report Series 914 (2002) <http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4875e/s4875e.pdf> accessed 12 January 2014.
25
Sundaram (n 22).
26
The Council for TRIPS is charged with the monitoring of WTO Members' compliance with their obligations under TRIPS. The legal basis for the establishment of the Council is found in Article IV.5 of the WTO Agreement, which stipulates that the Council 'shall oversee the functioning' of TRIPS Agreement. See also UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 10) 739.
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The World Health Assembly had in 1996 examined the relationship between public health and the TRIPS Agreement, as it was mandated to report on the impact of the work of the WTO with respect to national drug policies and essential drugs. This was addressed in a resolution on the Revised Drug Strategy, Resolution WHA 49.14 (25 May 1996).
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28 (Doha Declaration) made on November 2001 helped in resolving some of the above concerns and other divergent views held by the member states on the application and ambit of the TRIPS Agreement. 29 The concerns raised by the developing countries regarding the implications of the TRIPS Agreement on public health were reflected in the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. The Doha Declaration proclaimed that each Member had the right to grant compulsory licences and to determine the grounds for the grant and also what constituted a national emergency. This Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 30 of the TRIPS Agreement recognised the right of a country to gain access to medicines. Also, a lack of clarity and consensus on the TRIPS flexibilities had hampered the efforts to widen access to ARV treatment in developing and LDCs. 31 The Doha Declaration went a long way to clarify the scope of the TRIPS Agreement, besides providing interpretative guidance on the policy flexibilities embodied in the TRIPS Agreement. 32 Despite the above positives derived from the Doha Declaration 33 and UN commitments in the form of Millennium Goals, 34 much is left to be desired, 35 as the developing countries and LDCs still face big challenges in the implementation of the flexibilities due to increased IP protection introduced under the TRIPS Agreement.
36 Nevertheless, the Doha Declaration's impact has been widespread amongst developing countries, influencing their health policies, and in particular their pharmaceutical patent legislation. It is worth noting here that some developing countries have used the TRIPS flexibilities to produce and purchase generic ARV medications. There is also evidence of donor countries now permitting the use of their funds to procure generic ARV medications for LDCs. 37 The use of Ibid.
33
The Doha Declaration left unresolved the issue on how to export products manufactured under a compulsory license to countries without domestic production capacity. It also did not address the promise of increased R&D in exchange for higher levels of IP protection, which was used as a bargaining chip by the developed countries during TRIPS negotiations. E FM 't Hoen, The Global Politics of Pharmaceutical Monopoly Power: Drug Patents, Access, Innovation and the Application of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (ABM, The Netherlands 2009) 2-3. 34 The United Nations Millennium Development Goal, Target 8.E states that in cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, to provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries. United Nations, 'Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015' <http://www.un.org/ millenniumgoals/global.shtml> accessed 2 February 2014.
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According to 2008 figures released by the WHO, approximately a third of the people worldwide lack access to medicines. Further, the high prices of essential medicines act as a barrier in the treatment of millions.
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Deere (n 12). See also United Nations, 'The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013' <http:// www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/report-2013/mdg-report-2013-english.pdf> accessed 2 February 2014. Interestingly, the report does not list any entries under 8E of the Goals, which is aimed at providing access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries. 37 The value of donor-funded developing country ARV market has had a dramatic annual growth in recent times. By 2008, Indian generic ARVs accounted for 65% of the total value (US$463 million) of ARV purchases reported. See B Waning, E Diedrichsen and S Moon, 'A Lifeline to the flexibilities afforded under the Doha Declaration came for severe criticism from global pharmaceutical companies who were acting through their national governments, as they fiercely opposed the practical implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities, in the case of Brazil and Thailand in 2007-2008. 38 While the developing countries were eager to join the WTO and made to sign the TRIPS Agreement, most were in for a rude shock as the trade-off agreed between the developed and developing nations could not materialise. 39 To a great extent, the gap in the knowledge economy between the developed and developing countries (North-South divide) contributed to their ignorance of the TRIPS Agreement's implication and the flexibilities offered therein. 40 Although it is arguable that all of the parties were given the opportunity to participate in the negotiations leading to the TRIPS Agreement during the Uruguay Round of talks, the same may not hold good as the voice of the developing countries were effectively silenced through a series of manoeuvrings by the patent holding developed countries led by the USA, European Union (EU), Switzerland, and Japan. 41 The tactics included both economic pressure and the fear of exclusion from any future trade and investment opportunities. 3. Brazil background: exploration, history, and constitution Brazil 43 was under Portuguese colonial rule for over three centuries, between 1500 44 and 1823, 45 during which period the Civil law legal system was introduced in stages by the colonial powers. In the later part of the fifteenth century and during the sixteenth century, the Portuguese had to compete with the Spanish in the occupation and colonisation of the New World, which included the territory that came to be identified as Brazil. The Portuguese exploration of the continent came only eight years from Columbus's famous first voyage and required the intervention from the Papacy to resolve the disputes among the European neighbours on the administration and colonisation of the new territories in According to the author's analysis, the trade-off was access to foreign markets in exchange for raising domestic IP levels, which was a losing proposition. The present day Federative Republic of Brazil (Brazil) covers an area of 3,286,488 square miles and is the largest country in South America. It shares a border with almost all the countries in the continent, except Chile and Ecuador, and is also the most populous nation in the continent. 44 A fleet of 13 Portuguese ships under the command of Pedro Álvares Cabral reached Brazil on 23 April 1500. Following in the successful footsteps of Vasco Da Gama's epic voyage to India in 1497, the fleet in 1500 was also headed for India, but the lead ship under the command of Cabral veered off course into the Atlantic, sailing due west, and eventually arrived in Brazil. TE Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries of Change (Oxford, 1999) 5; C de Abreu, Chapters of Brazil's Colonial History 1500-1800 (Oxford, 1998) 58-59. 45 For a brief period of time in the seventeenth century, between 1630 and 1654, the northern part of Brazil (referred to as New Holland) came under Dutch rule through the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie). South America. 46 In 1532, the first Portuguese colonial town was established in Sao Vincente, and in 1549 a colonial capital was established in Salvador on the Bahiha de Todosos Santos, which signalled the intent of Portugal to settle and protect the region from other rival European powers. 47 This move to colonise Brazil was to benefit Portugal, as in the sixteenth century its fortunes in Asia faced challenges from the Dutch East India Company. In the centuries to follow, Brazil witnessed numerous struggles and uprisings between the natives 48 and later among the settlers 49 of the land to seize power.
In 1808, the Portuguese Royal Court relocated to Brazil, as a tactical move to evade Napoleon's army, which had invaded and captured Iberia, and in 1815 Brazil was elevated to the status of an empire. 50 On 22 September 1822, Prince Pedro I declared himself as 'Emperor Pedro I' of Brazil, and the following year in September 1823 Brazil proclaimed independence from Portugal. 51 The newly independent state of Brazil adopted its first constitution in 1824 52 Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius, a German naturalist who travelled and wrote about Brazil in the nineteenth century, was of the view the real history of Brazil was the mixing of its human elements, namely, native Indian tribes, Europeans, and the Africans. He famously quoted that, The history of Brazil will always be primarily a branch of Portuguese history. However, if Brazilian history is to be complete and to deserve the name history, it can never exclude the roles played by the Ethiopian and Indian races. (S Schwartz, 'Introduction' in C de Abreu, Chapters of Brazil's Colonial History 1500-1800 (Oxford, 1998) xviii) 49 More than half of Brazilians claim European ancestry through immigrants from Portugal, Germany, Italy, Spain, and other countries. Nearly 44% claim ancestry from African slaves imported by the Portuguese settlers. The other ethnicities come from Middle East and Asia, which also includes the largest settlement of Japanese outside Japan. Interestingly, less than a 1% of the total population can be traced as descendants of the indigenous people who inhabited the land before the arrival of the European settlers in 1500. Meade (n 46) xvi. See also Skidmore (n 44) at 42, where the author mentions the role of Britain in the abolition of slavery in Brazil. Emperor Pedro I was the son of Dom João VI of Portugal. It is to be noted that no other former colony has ever embraced as its monarch a member of the ruling family of the very country it rebelled against to attain freedom. Skidmore (n 44) 37. Emperor Pedro I had the backing of the Brazilian Aristocracy, and the British, who were eager to monopolise the trade links with Brazil. Meade (n 46) 69.
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The 1824 Constitution, also known as Constituição Política do Império do Brasil, governed the country for six decades after Independence (1822-1889). Following the adoption of its first Constitution, Brazil enacted its first Criminal Code in 1830 followed by the Commercial Code in 1850, and interestingly no Civil Code was enacted during this period. 53 Recognition by Britain was more crucial, as it was the leading European power in the nineteenth century. Besides, Brazil owed Portugal a debt of $7,000,000, which in turn Portugal had borrowed attend to political matters in Portugal, leaving a five-year-old Pedro II to be the ruler of Brazil, in his absence. This saw the beginning of a period of revolt, struggle and a fiveyear warfare with Paraguay, which eventually ended with the brutal defeat of Paraguay in 1871, and leaving Brazil with a huge fiscal deficit. 54 Brazil was to pass laws in 1888 abolishing slavery after years of struggle and international pressure from the USA, Britain, 55 and France. 56 On 15 November 1889, the emperor Dom Pedro II was ousted from power in a bloodless coup and went into exile in Portugal. This effectively brought to an end monarchic rule in Brazil and also Portugal's direct intervention in Brazil's governance. Following the ouster of Dom Pedro II, Brazil's second constitution was written in 1891, paving the way for the creation of a federation, with extensive powers granted to regional governors.
Brazilian constitution
It is necessary for our purposes to trace the roots of the modern day Brazilian constitution from the time Brazil declared itself a Republic, as it presents an interesting picture of the crucial role the nation's constitution played in recognising the right to health as a constitutional right, in the formulation of health policies in its fight against AIDS/HIV, and also in the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities in the late 1990s. The 1891 Constitution, the first constitution of the Republic, replaced monarchy with a directly elected president. 57 Although a Civil law country, Brazil's Constitution was drawn up along the lines of the US Constitution, 58 except for certain parts derived from the Argentine Constitution of 1853-1860. 59 The 1891 Constitution was to remain in force till 1934, when the members of the Brazilian Constituent Assembly signed a new Constitution on 16 July 1934. The Constitution signed in 1934 had a very short life span, as it was to last a mere three years before being replaced by the 1937 Constitution. 60 from Britain. During this period Britain was a dominant player in Brazilian economy through trade and direct investment. Skidmore (n 44) 42; Meade (n 46) 70.
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Brazil was also constrained to take very big loans from Britain to finance the war. Skidmore (n 44) 62-64. 55 British warships entered the Brazilian territorial waters in 1850, with a view to seize and destroy ships carrying contraband slaves. Meade (n 46) 79.
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The abolitionist arguments were starting to be heard during the late 1860s and early 1870s and gradually took a firm grip on the society. On 13 May 1888, after several failed attempts in Parliament and nearly 18 years from the day the war with Paraguay was won, the Brazilian Parliament passed legislation approving total and immediate abolition of slavery without compensation to the former slave owners. Skidmore (n 44) 65-70. 57 The 1891 constitution also disestablished the Roman Catholic Church, and the new government also ordered the destruction of all records relating to slavery. The objective was twofold, on the one hand it helped destroy the traces of a shameful passage in the history of Brazil, and on the other hand it also made it impossible for any attempts from the former slaveholders for compensation. Skidmore (n 44) 75-76. 58 Unlike Brazil, which has a Civil law legal system, the US legal system is based on the Common law legal traditions derived from Britain. While Britain has an unwritten constitution, the USA has an elaborate written Constitution. Interestingly, the 1891 constitution contained a Declaration of Rights, drawing largely from the First Amendment of the US Constitution, 61 and was liberal and secular. A large part of the individual rights contained in the 1891 Constitution were retained in the Constitution of 1934, with a further declaration that Brazil will not resort to a War of Conquest. 62 The 1937 Constitution while retaining most of the rights contained in the 1934 Constitution, reintroduced capital punishment for certain offences. The Constitution of 1946 increased the rights 63 and contained more guarantees for the citizens. Further, it also abolished capital punishment, which was reintroduced under the 1937 Constitution. Brazil was to go through a phase of tumultuous change through military dictatorship in the 1960s, 64 which was to last for over two decades and saw the Constitution and the Declaration of Rights therein contained suspended for the same period of time. This marked a low point in the modern history of Brazil and took the nation decades to recover from, as it caused much harm to its socio-economic conditions and left the political institutions, if not defunct, in disarray. By the time the military lost power in 1985, the inflation was at an all-time high of 235%.
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Rebuilding of parliamentary democracy after a hiatus of over two decades required the new government to work on the creation of a new Constitution to replace the 'Institutional Acts' passed by the military rule, 66 and thereby restore faith in democracy. The task was entrusted to the Constituent Assembly which was elected in 1986, to act as the Constitutional Convention. The drafting process witnessed lengthy debates and intense lobbying, both in the parliament and in public, and took over a year to complete. 67 The Republic's seventh 68 Constitution was successfully passed on 5 October 1988, enshrining provisions that conferred extraordinary rights on citizens, which were not identifiable in the previous editions of the Constitution. One feature that stood out was the recognition of right to health 61 The US Constitution is credited with having a detailed Bill of Rights in the form of amendments, guaranteeing a number of personal freedoms for its citizens. Health is a right of all and the responsibility of the State, to be guaranteed by means of social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards, and all the universal and equal access to actions and services for its promotion, protection and recovery.
Most importantly, under the 1988 Constitution 70 right to health is not an aspiration but a fundamental right, which creates rights in citizens and obligations in the State, professing instant application. Drawing from the Civil law traditions, the Constitution grants the above private rights on the citizens. 71 Article 6 72 declares that education, health, work, leisure, security, social security, protection of maternity and infancy, and assistance of the unprotected are social rights. Under the 1988 Constitution, the right to health is perceived as an essential condition in preserving the constitutional principles of the dignity of the human being guaranteed in Article 1, III, 73 and the right to life guaranteed under Article 5. Article 5: All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever, Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, to equality, to security and to property, on the following terms: (I-LXVII). the 1988 Constitution does not identify access to medicines as a constitutional right, the legislation implementing the right to health does so. 77 Article 6(I) of Lei 8.080/90, specifically addresses this issue, by stating that SUS … must be responsible for promoting full medical assistance, which includes pharmaceutical assistance.
The setting up of the SUS enabled Brazil to bring in some 60 million citizens who were excluded from the earlier centralised National Health Service (NHS) operated under the military rule. 78 The SUS treats those who seek access to health services as rights-holding citizens rather than 'empowered clients,' which is a clear departure from the earlier system where the seekers/patients were seen as passive recipients. 79 The SUS has been built on the principles of universality, comprehensive care, equity, decentralisation, and social oversight (controle social).
80 In short, the SUS is a publicly funded rights-based universal health system, which does not restrict access to medical care and medicines to its citizens, but one that empowers them to seek access to health care and medicines. The pursuit of access to health started with the decentralisation of the health system. Further health-care laws were passed in 1990, 1993, and 1996 to define more clearly the role of each level of government in delivering health care as envisaged under the Constitution. 81 It will not be an exaggeration to state that the SUS, in its 25 years of operations, has fundamentally transformed the Brazilian health-care system to achieve its Constitutional guarantee of right to health.
3.2.1. Response to HIV/AIDS epidemic: right to health and pharmaceutical patents A study of Brazil's TRIPS Agreement implementations cannot be carried out without paying due attention to its 'right to health agenda' and the fight against HIV/AIDS. Brazil launched its anti-AIDS programme in 1983, and its response to HIV/AIDS in the years to come was very positive and to be lauded, especially coming soon after emerging from over two decades of military rule. The 1988 constitution, which heralded a new era by conferring the right to health as a constitutional right, and the pioneering work of Brazilian researchers, under the leadership of Bernardo Galvão-Castro, in the isolation of the HIV virus in the 1980s can be viewed as contributing factors in the robust response of Brazil to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Two years prior to the promulgation of the new Constitution, Brazil, in response to the epidemic, established its National STD and AIDS Committee, a national AIDS Committee, and also a National AIDS/STD Control Programme (NAP).
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The Brazilian government developed an aggressive and innovative programme with a 77 Rosina, Wang and de Campos (n 75) 105. strong emphasis on both prevention 83 and treatment through early government response, effective participation of civil society, and the advocacy of human rights in all strategies and actions. In May 2005, Brazil courted controversy, when it turned down over US$40 million worth of aid money from the USA, as acceptance of the money required Brazil to condemn commercial sex workers, and advocate sexual abstinence, and would have required Brazil to alter its anti-AIDS programme. 84 These measures alone were not sufficient for health care for the individuals, as any policy drafted in this regard was strongly reliant on the right to health guaranteed under the 1988 Constitution. Unfortunately the decentralised public health institutions could only become operational after the Brazilian Congress passed the Basic Orientation Laws (Normas Operacionais Básicas) in the 1990s. 85 According to a World Bank projection, made in the early 1980s, Brazil was expected to have 1.2 million people living with HIV by 2000, but statistics from 2006 on HIV prevalence showed that only an estimated 660,000 Brazilians lived with HIV/AIDS, which was purely due to Brazil's extensive HIV/AIDS Programme. 86 Even then, Brazil had the highest absolute number of HIV cases than any other country in Latin America. 87 The National Program for Exceptional Medicines, which was established under Ordinance 2.577/06, supplied strategic medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, influenza, and meningitis. 88 Brazil also passed Lei 9.313/96 to guarantee free and universal access to all HIV/AIDS treatments within the SUS, thereby setting up a publically funded health-care system to provide free universal access to highly active antiretroviral therapy for people living with HIV/AIDS. 89 It was the first developing country to implement a large-scale universal ARV distribution programme. Brazil in the mid-1990s decided to take direct action in its fight against HIV/AIDS and began producing seven non-patented ARV drugs in the Health Ministry factories and laboratories, 90 which only produced limited results due the new patent laws introduced in 1996. 91 The new laws which were introduced pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement, required Brazil to recognise IP rights protection for pharmaceutical products for 20 years, and did not allow for the realisation of the goals set under the NAP. The success and failure of the health-care system and the response to HIV/AIDS epidemic cannot be judged without a study of some of the internal and external factors which had come to interfere in the realisation of the constitutional goal of right to health. The implementation of the TRIPS Agreement into Brazil's national laws and the use of flexibilities afforded under the said Agreement are identified as key factors that have further influenced, or rather hindered in the delivery of the health-care system through the SUS, and the same are studied in the following sections.
3.3. Brazilian patent laws: the nineteenth-century Alvará to TRIPS implementation Brazilian patent laws could be traced back to 1809, when a system of licencing, or alvará, 92 was introduced by Dom João VI, to stimulate invention in an economy primarily driven by agriculture. Brazil's first Constitution of 1824 recognised the right of inventors to a privilege, or remuneration for the use of their invention, which was followed by the passing of the 1830 laws recognising the rights of inventors. 93 Brazil introduced new patent laws in 1882, nearly 60 years after independence from Portugal. The new laws were based on universal novelty and granted patent for a period of 15 years, with the state retaining the right to appropriate the patent on grounds of public necessity or utility. 94 The laws introduced in 1882 even contemplated the possible grant of patents on chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and proceeded to set up a system of targeted examination of select areas of patents which affected public interests, namely, food, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 95 It is worth mentioning that Brazil is one of the founding members of the Paris Convention 96 and Berne Convention, 97 which were concluded round about the time its new patent laws were introduced in 1882. It is safe to assume that the laws enacted in 1882 did not in any way contribute to the economic growth of the nation in the nineteenth century and had minimal impact.
98 Brazil adopted a policy of Import Substituting Industrialisation 99 in the 1950s and 1960s, which required the regulation of the transfer of technology 91 Nunn (n 81) 25. Brazil's domestic pharmaceutical industry is a major supplier to the domestic public health system, historically benefitting from decades of a regime of non-patent protection. See Cohen and Lybecker (n 90) 214. mechanism from foreign to domestic companies on terms more suitable for its own goals. 100 While implementing the ISI policy, Brazil undertook a review of its patent laws, as under existing norms overseas patent holders of technology were more advantaged, as they could easily exploit the laws to create monopoly and also negotiate a better price for the use of their technology. 101 In response, Brazil reformed its patent laws to have better control over the technology transfer process. 102 As part of the reformative measure, the National Institute of Industrial Property, or Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial (NIIP), was formed, and was also entrusted with the key responsibility of administering patent law and technology transfer agreements. 103 In December 1971, Brazil made further revision to its patent laws in Lei 5.772/71, excluding a number of pharmaceutical processes and products from the grant of patent. Under the 1971 laws, the term of patent was to last for 15 years and also contained provision for pre-grant opposition from third parties. Most notably, the 1971 laws contained provisions for the grant of compulsory licences, including, on the grounds of an absence of actual working of the patent in Brazil. 104 In 1991, new IP legislation was presented to the Congress by the then President Collor de Mello for discussion, with a view to bring Brazil's laws into compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.
105 While the bill was still being debated, the Congress approved the TRIPS Agreement in Legislative Decree No. 1355 of 30 December 1994, which became effective in Brazil on 1 January 1995. 106 Although TRIPS Agreement's transitional provisions under Article 65 permits the delayed implementation 107 of the product patent regime for pharmaceutical patents in developing countries, Brazil failed to take advantage and delay the implementation. 108 As a result, the TRIPS Agreement was incorporated in its entirety In 1996, the Brazilian Congress under President Cardoso passed the Industrial Property Law (LPI) Lei 9.279/96 to repeal the 1971 patent law, and the new laws came into force on 15 May 1997. Under the old laws (Lei 5.772/71 Art 9c.), patenting of pharmaceuticals process and products was forbidden. The new law of 1996 introduced a higher level of protection for pharmaceutical patents and also allowed for the patenting of chemical products. Brazil's early compliance to the TRIPS Agreement proved to be a grave mistake, as it witnessed the price of ARVs rise due to the elimination of the possibility of generic production of patented drugs domestically. Some writers attribute the early changes brought about to the Brazilian legislation down to economic and political pressure exerted by the USA to comply with the TRIPS Agreement before the 2005 legal deadline, 111 while others attribute it to pressure from multinational pharmaceutical corporations seeking to exploit newer foreign markets through a higher level of patent protection. 112 This early compliance was also to greatly disadvantage the implementation of the HIV/AIDS programme envisaged by the Brazilian government.
3.3.1. Key provisions 1: parallel imports, Bolar exception, and compulsory licensing
The global discussion on the issue of compulsory licence became more intense in the early 1990s in the wake of the HIV/AIDS crisis. The discussions presented a grim picture of the situation prevailing in the developing countries and LDCs, where the most affected populations came from, and access to ARV treatment was not possible due to exorbitant costs. In the above regions, patented drugs for the treatment of the disease were, and are still, unaffordable and beyond the reach of the sufferers, and generic ARVs are seen as the only affordable option, and solution, for the frontline treatment HIV/AIDS sufferers. 113 It is worth mentioning that patent protection is often cited as the key contributing factor for the non-affordability of medication for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. 114 In such instances, the grant of compulsory licences or, the threat of such a grant by the concerned government is the only option for the procurement of generic ARVs. One of the main reasons for the India, another developing country and a generics manufacturer, delayed the implementation of the product patent regime for pharmaceutical patents to gain full advantage of the transitional arrangements under Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement. Flexibilities afforded certain concessions (time-bound implementation and others) to the developing and LDCs to help implement the TRIPS Agreement. Yet, it had proved to be ineffective, as the developing countries and LDCs still struggle in their pursuit of access to medicines in the treatment of diseases. 109 Schulz and Wu (n 99). failure in the attempts to revise the Paris Convention 1983 in the late 1980s and early 1990s is attributed to the developed and developing countries disagreeing on the extent of powers that governments should retain for the grant of compulsory licences, and the how those powers, if and when retained are to be exercised. 115 Compulsory licensing of patented drugs, which enables the access to essential medicines in times of need, is identified as one of the essential pillars of the patent system and is recognised under the TRIPS Agreement and also under other international conventions. 116 The Doha Declaration unequivocally states that every WTO Member has 'the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.'
117 Importantly, the text of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement was consciously drafted by the negotiating group to avoid any disease-based limitation being imposed on the member countries seeking to invoke the provision.
118 Canada and the UK, both developed countries, have used compulsory licensing provisions available under their national legislations whenever possible. 119 The USA has not adopted a statutory regime of granting compulsory licence but has nevertheless allowed the practice under antitrust laws. One of the most important features of the 1996 LPI was the introduction of provisions relating to the grant of compulsory licences. The Lei 9.279/96, passed on 14 May 1996 was to come into force on 15 May 1997, with the exception of 'pipeline' provisions, which came into force immediately. The net result was that 'pipeline' applications based on foreign patents for pharmaceuticals and chemical compounds were automatically granted, waiving the novelty requirement. 121 In 1998, Brazil decided to increase domestic production of generic ARVs and also to issue compulsory licences on patented ARVs to meet its domestic requirements. In 1999, the Brazilian National Congress set up a Parliamentary Inquest Committee (CPI) to investigate the reasons behind the exorbitant rise in prices of the medicines sold in Brazil. 122 In 1999 Brazil introduced the National Drug Policy (Health Ministry Portaria 3.916), which was aimed at completely decentralising drug policy. 123 A combination of decreasing stocks of ARVs, devaluation of its currency, and a pressing need to meet its commitment to the HIV/AIDS programme paved the way for Brazil to pass the 1999 Presidential Decree (under former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso) amending Article 71 of the LPI, relating to the issue of compulsory licences.
124 Articles 68-74, Chapter VIII, s.III of the LPI provide for the grant of compulsory licences if the patent holder exercises the rights granted thereunder in an abusive manner, or abuses its economic power, or when the patented product is not exploited within Brazil, or when the sale of the patented product fails to satisfy the needs of the market (the 'local working' requirement). 125 Article 68, in particular, requires that the subject matter of the patent must be manufactured in Brazil within three years of receiving a patent and failure to do so within this time frame will allow Brazilian companies to apply to the government for manufacture of the patented product Geneva 2000) 95. The USA had in the past granted a number of compulsory licences to remedy anticompetitive practices and for governmental use, including national security. For instance in the CibaGeigy and Sandoz merger of 1997, both pharmaceutical corporations were required to license a large portfolio of patents, haemophilia gene rights, data know-how relating to HSV-tk, etc., to RhonePoulenc Rorer. The newly created entity, Novartis, was also required to grant such non-exclusive licences to requesters in certain instances. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the USA also invoked government use powers on a routine basis to order generic medicines from abroad, regardless of the patent status of the products. 121 Schulz and Wu (n 99). 122 M Basso and EB Rodrigues Jr, Intellectual Property Law in Brazil (Kluwer, 2010) 78. José Serra, the then State Minister for Health, identified patent protection of pharmaceuticals as one of the most important factors in determining the prices of medicines. Interestingly, one of the recommendations of the CPI was the withdrawal of Brazil's membership of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1983. 123 José Serra, the then State Minister for Health, is seen as being key for taking the decision to introduce the National Drug Policy and also in the increase in production of generic ARVs in Brazil. José Serra, an economist and later a politician, was in exile during most part of the military regime, between 1964 and 1978 in Bolivia, France, Chile, and the USA. The obligation to work a patent was provided for in a large number of domestic patent laws in the nineteenth century. However, during the twentieth century, most industrialised countries either relaxed or eliminated such an obligation from their laws. This was done primarily to ensure that patent holders had the option of exploiting their patents merely through importation, and thereby facilitate trans-border activities in an increasingly globalised world market.
domestically. 126 The Brazilian government also passed suitable legislation on Generic Drugs Law in November 1999 to require all government purchasing contracts to be generic drugs 127 and all prescriptions to be written using generic names.
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In 2001, four years after implementing the TRIPS Agreement, Brazil took advantage of the flexibilities and incorporated the Bolar exception, which is contained in Lei 10. 196/2001 under item VII to Article 43. Incorporation of the Bolar exception had a twofold advantage for Brazil, as in addition to promoting quicker entry of generic drugs into the market, it also enabled information on the invention to be used for further research into ARVs.
129 Brazil only has a limited scope for the implementation of parallel imports, as its use is restricted to situations where a compulsory licence under Article 68, Paras 3 and 4 of LPI has been issued due to abuse of economic power by the patent holder. 130 The issue of parallel imports would fall under the principles of exhaustion of patent rights, 131 where the rights of a patent holder are exhausted as to those specific goods once it enters the market, and the patent holder cannot prevent their resale to other countries. In this regard, the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration allow member states to determine the scope and extent of exhaustion of patent rights, 132 although some developed countries remain strongly opposed to this interpretation. 133 Parallel importation is viewed as an important mechanism for drug-access policies, and available under the TRIPS flexibilities for developing countries, that has not been effectively used by Brazil in the implementation process. 3.3.1.1. Use of compulsory licensing provision. Even though Brazil had never used the obligatory licensing system, it had adopted a strategy of threat to issue compulsory licences the effect of the provisions of TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment … 134 Chaves, Vieira and Reis (n 129). This is an extremely important mechanism for drug-access policies, since multinational pharmaceutical companies usually set different prices for the same drug in different countries. If implemented, Brazil could possibly import medicines from wherever it is sold at the lowest price to benefit its HIV/AIDS programme and also honouring the constitutional right to health.
to pressure drug companies in price negotiations for ARV medications. 135 Since the introduction of the compulsory licencing provisions into Brazilian laws, the US government, as early as January 2001, requested the opening of a consultation with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSU) of the WTO on the above provision, on the basis that the obligation for local production imposed by the Brazilian law violated Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement. As both the USA and Brazil reached an agreement, the matter never went before the panel for a full consideration of the issues identified for consultation. 136 Under the agreement, both the USA and Brazil agreed to enter into bilateral discussions before Brazil proceeded to make use of the compulsory licencing provisions under Article 68 against a US patent holder. 137 This agreement does not, however, prevent Brazil from granting a compulsory licence based on Article 68, but nevertheless, requires it to enter into bilateral discussions with the USA. 138 The critical factor in making the HIV/AIDS programme and access to medicines being affordable may be the capacity to domestically produce the drugs, and also a credible threat of domestic production used by the Brazilian government. 139 The strategy had worked well for Brazil as the transnational pharmaceutical companies were willing to lower the price of their products rather than have them produced domestically in Brazil. 140 It had also seen the reduction in price of some of the ARVs used in the frontline treatment of HIV/AIDS. In 2005, Brazil was able to get the pharmaceutical company and patent holder Abbott Laboratories to lower the price of lopinavir/ritonavir, 141 which was being actively used in the treatment of about 17,000 patients, by 56%. This was achieved through a presidential decree, declaring that the medicine was of public interest and that the patent holder Abbott was required to offer the product at a lower price. Eventually, a deal was struck whereby Abbott Laboratories agreed for a fixed price of US$1380 to be charged per patient per year till 2011, regardless of any price variation, in return for the Brazilian government guaranteeing that it will not issue any compulsory licence for the above drug.
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In 2007, for the first time, Brazil went beyond its original strategy of threat to issue a compulsory licence. The ARV drug 'efavirenz' marketed as 'stocrinby' by its patent 135 Chaves, Vieira and Reis (n 129) 170-71. 136 137 Correa (n 125). 138 Correa (n 125). 139 Cohen and Lybecker (n 90) 217. 140 Chaves, Vieira and Reis (n 129) 170-71. The authors also point out that since the Brazilian government had never actually issued a compulsory licence (before 2007) for domestic production of any medicines, the negotiating strategy had not been so successful and the prices agreed in later rounds were unsatisfactory. For example, the discounts secured for the new drugs 'tenofovir' and 'atazanavir' (both ARV drugs) were 5.2% and 7.7%, respectively. Also, the average annual expenditure per patient in 2005 rose to R$6,124, on a par with the figure in 1998. For a discussion on the role of compulsory licenses as a development strategy, see generally Chung (n 107). 141 Lopinavir/ritonavir, a fixed-dose combination drug which is used in the treatment of HIV infection, is marketed by its patent holder Abbott Laboratories as Kaletra and also as Aluvia in different parts of the world. 142 Chaves, Vieira and Reis (n 129) 171. Although the civil society groups in Brazil support the use of compulsory licencing, in the instant case it viewed the deal as imposition of TRIPS-plus provisions, as it included clauses that were more restrictive than those adopted by TRIPS. It is worth mentioning that Brazil used the threat of compulsory licences on the patent for Glivec (marketed in the USA as Gleevec) to obtain a price discount of more than 65%.
holder Merck Sharp & Dohme (Merck) was the most used drug in 2007, and the going price that year was US$580 per patient. 143 Under Brazil's anti-AIDS programme close to 77,000 patients were being treated with efavirenz. During the negotiations, prior to the grant of the compulsory licence, Merck was selling efavirenz at a cheaper price in countries of the similar development level as Brazil, but with fewer patients in need of treatment than Brazil, and during the same time Indian generic versions of the drug were much cheaper than Merck's. 144 The cost of efavirenz in Thailand was approximately US$245 per patient, and the price for the supply of efavirenz by WHO prequalified laboratories, ranged around US$163. During negotiations Merck would only offer a price reduction from US$1.59 to US$1.10 per dose, and as a result the Brazilian government was constrained to issue a Presidential Decree No 6.108, dated 4 May 2007 granting 'compulsory license, on the ground of public interest, of efavirenz's patent, for 'public non-commercial use' for a period of five years, and for a fee of 1.5% to the patent owner of the finished product. 145 Prior to the grant of compulsory licence, efavirenz was approximately 12% of the cost of the Brazilian Government's expenditures for ARV drugs, and with the local production of the drug in 2009 the cost dropped to 3.9%. 146 Following the grant of compulsory licence, a spokesperson for Merck commented that 'this expropriation of IP sends a chilling signal to research-based companies about the attractiveness of undertaking risky research on diseases that affect the developing world.' 147 One does not have any doubt that Brazil will continue to explore the use of compulsory licences if the need arises, as its successful anti-AIDS programme and its commitment to the constitutional right to health and access to medicines strongly hinge on the availability of affordable medicines. Sanofi-Aventis SA, Novartis AG, and Eli Lilly & Co., for periods extending for as long as eight months. 149 The EC Regulation BMR 1383/2003 tasks national customs offices with policing IP laws on goods entering or transiting through their posts. Using the powers under the above Regulation, customs officials acted ex officio to initiate temporary seizures, and based on fictional patent violations, to impound and thereby delay shipments of life-saving medicines bound from India to countries in Africa, Latin America, and Oceania.
150 A shipment of the generic drug Losartan Potassium, used in the treatment of high blood pressure, destined for Brazil was also one of the consignments seized while in transit at Schipol Airport, in the Netherlands in December 2008, and was later returned to India, the country of origin. 151 The Indian representative speaking at the TRIPS council meeting held on 27-28 October and 6 November 2009 deemed the seizure in transit as one of many 'serious impediments to access to medicines.' 152 It was pointed out by the Indian representative that the seizure-in-transit incident was inconsistent with the Paragraph 6 System, as such seizure could prevent the hypothetical shipment of a generic drug from an exporting country to a LDC in a timely manner. 153 The practice of seizure of medicines-in-transit for fictional violation of IP rights was strongly decried by scholars, 154 as it violated core principles of the TRIPS Agreement. The above seizures and EU's delayed and defensive responses to repeated expressions of diplomatic and human rights concerns led both Brazil and India to seek consultations with the EU and the Netherlands before the DSU in the WTO. 155 Following negotiations among the parties, on 28 July 2011, the Government of India announced the reaching of an 'understanding' in principle with the EU over the pending compliant before the DSU challenging EU's action regarding the seizure of generic medicines-in-transit. 156 Whatever the outcome of the dispute before the WTO, the whole episode painted a very negative picture of the pharmaceutical patent-holding developed countries within the EU who were using customs measures to impound generic drugs destined for developing countries and LDCs, as it made a mockery of EU's commitment to access to medicines. Unfortunately, Brazil was at the receiving end of the above events, as legally produced life-saving generics medicines destined for its shores were seized in transit in a developed country, thereby denying access to medicines to the vulnerable patients in a developing country.
3.3.2. Key provisions 2: prior consent, Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, and second-use medical patent Following the CPI recommendations, Brazil adopted provisional measures amending the LPI, establishing the mechanism of 'prior consent' in the examination of patent applications from pharmaceutical and chemical industry. 157 This newly set up system saw the applications being scrutinised by INPI and the National Health Surveillance Agency of Brazil, or Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária (ANVISA). 158 In December 1999, Brazil's legislature passed the 'prior consent,' or anuência prévia rule, which is contained in Article 229-C. 159 This Article, sadly, offered little or no guidelines as to the 'shared competence' or duties of INPI and ANVISA in the scrutiny of patent applications for pharmaceutical and chemicals. 160 On 14 February 2001, the Brazilian government passed Lei 10.196/2001, amending Article 229-C to make 'prior consent' a permanent feature of its LPI and included the stipulation that the grant of all patents for pharmaceutical products and processes was subject to ANVISA's prior approval. 161 Later, ANVISA issued a resolution (RDC-45) to clarify its competence in such matters regarding the examination of pharmaceutical patent applications. 162 The INPI, an authority created in 1970 and charged with the scrutiny of the patent applications under the LPI performs a different role to that of the ANVISA, but yet to a great degree its decisions are subject to the authority of the ANVISA, leading to a cumbersome and long drawn patent examination process in case of pharmaceutical and chemical patent applications. One should note, and not forget, that these two bodies are governed by different interests. ANVISA pursues the harmonisation of the protection of IP rights with the protection of public health by exploiting legal flexibilities offered under the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration, while INPI 157 Basso and Rodrigues Jr (n 122). 158 ANVISA is a regulatory agency with independent administration and financial autonomy. Besides coordinating with the National Sanitary Surveillance System and monitoring drug products and medical device prices, it is also tasked with the 'patentability' examination for pharmaceutical patents along with the INPI. Its role is akin to that of the Food and Drug Administration of the USA. 159 Article 229-C reads as follows: the concession of granting patents for pharmaceutical products and processes will depend on the prior consent of the National Agency of Sanitary Vigilance (ANVISA). 160 follows the guidelines contained in Brazilian LPI, which was modified following Brazil's accession to the WTO. 163 Some authors have expressed the view that prior consent process introduced by Brazil is keeping in line with the TRIPS Agreement. 164 Working of the ENVISA demonstrates that it does not grant prior consent to (i) applications filed with insufficient description, (ii) claims from Markush 165 groups, (iii) selections of chemical macrostructures, (iv) polymorphs, (v) raceme/isomeric mixes, and (vi) second medical-use patent claims. 166 ANVISA, in a report issued in 2004, clarified that it will not grant prior consent filings related to second-use patents, which is contradictory to the policy of protecting second-and new-use patents by the INPI. 167 This brings us to the discussion on granting of patents based on second and subsequent medical use. Supporters of the second-and subsequent-use patents argue that they protect discoveries of new uses for substances, active principles, molecules, or compounds that have been previously patented or, are already in the public domain.
168 Subsequent patent use involves new prescribed functions of pharmaceuticals already known and used within the medical community for different purposes. 169 In effect, a second or subsequent medical-use patent, if granted, protects the discovery of a new medical application for a product that has already been recognised and utilised in the medical field.
170 The other major argument used by supporters of second-use patents is that the human and economic investment incurred by the pharmaceutical industry to discover a second use is comparable to the investment necessary to develop the product or drug as such, and hence the need for recognition. 171 In the UK, the position on grant of secondand subsequent-use pharmaceutical patent 172 164 Chaves, Vieira and Reis (n 129). The authors argue that prior consent is in full compliance with Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, which permits members to adopt necessary measures into their domestic laws to protect public health and promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development. 165 The term 'Markush group' refers to a list of 'alternatives' set forth in a claim, and is named after Eugene Markush who successfully used a claim form that defined a genus by enumeration of the species in the 1920s Merck's patent for a drug used in male pattern baldness. The European regulatory legislation as originally drafted (EPC 1973) facilitated access to generic drugs within the EU, but an interpretation of new laws from 2000 by the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) does not exclude second-or subsequent-use pharmaceutical patent.
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In practice, the pharmaceutical corporations often use the second use as a tool to extend the commercial life of patents, which strategy is widely referred to as evergreening, thereby maximising on the monopoly period enjoyed by the patented drug. 175 The practice of evergreening considerably delays and poses a threat for the legal entry of generics into the market, and can successfully prevent competition in the pharmaceutical market, although some pharmaceutical corporations do believe that the term evergreening is pejorative and misleading. 176 Recent Brazilian court decisions have sent out mixed signals on ANVISA's role in the scrutiny of pharmaceutical applications. 177 One decision, in particular delivered in 2013, has held that it is possible to grant patent protection for items not listed as non-patentable in Lei 9.279/96, which technically threw the door open for seeking protection on second-and subsequent-use pharmaceutical patents. If the judicial trend of granting patents to second and subsequent use are to continue, Brazil may find itself in a very sticky wicket as it will potentially harm its HIV/AIDS programme, which is strongly reliant on generic drugs. Granting of second-and subsequent-use medical patents will see a huge price rise in pharmaceutical products and can spell the death knell of the access to medicines programme put in place by the Brazilian government following its commitment to health as a constitutional right, as the goals will likely become unachievable. As seen from a number of decisions made by ANVISA, its position is clearly not in favour of granting second-and subsequent-use medical patents. India, another developing country and also a major generics drugs manufacturer, introduced TRIPS compliant patent laws in 2005, thereby moving from a process patent regime to a product patent regime. The new patent law introduced by India included such provisions to check the practice of evergreening, which effectively outlaws granting of secondand subsequent-use pharmaceutical patents, 179 which provisions were upheld by the Supreme Court of India in the Novartis 180 case decided in April 2013. From the above discussion it can be inferred that the system of prior consent introduced to prevent the exploitation of the patent system by transnational pharmaceutical corporations had come under severe scrutiny, with some appreciating the measures 181 taken by Brazil and others criticising the practice on the premise that it has led to divergent decisions being taken on pharmaceutical patent applications. 182 Although the arrangement was initially welcomed by INPI, the relationship of the two organisations was to deteriorate in the years that followed, with the INPI failing to acknowledge ANVISA's role in the 'prior consent' process. 183 The ANVISA for its part introduced measures to reassert its authority over the patent office. 184 The ANVISA had received a very strong and active support from civil society groups who were, and still are, interested in furthering the cause of the Brazil's AIDS programme, and integration of peoples programme. 185 The domestic pharmaceutical sector originally welcomed the 'prior consent' process when introduced in 2001, but later on was not so keen to promote the cause of the same. 186 This change in stance was clearly due to the fact that there was a bias against the grant of patents for incremental innovations, 187 The involvement of ANVISA in the scrutiny of pharmaceutical patents is viewed as the main reason for the backlog before the Brazilian Patent Office, and it is clear that this process has largely slowed down the grant of patents. Brazil has come under tremendous external pressure due to the introduction of 'prior consent,' although the process as a mechanism in the scrutiny of patent application appears to be acceptable under the TRIPS Agreement. 189 While analysing the pros and cons of the 'prior consent' process, one should take on board the fact that it was introduced by the Brazilian government into its IP legislation as part of its commitment in its vision to provide free public health at a time of crisis, and on the premise that patents for pharmaceuticals are different from patents for other technologies due to their implications on public health and special relationship with society.
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With growing opposition from within and without, Brazil has boldly continued with the practice on the back of popular support from its citizens and civil society group, and other NGOs. Proposals for reforms announced by the Brazilian government to the patent law provisions, their possible consequence to the existing system, and the knock-on effect on the access to medicines programme and the HIV/AIDS programme are discussed in the later part of this study.
Access to health and medicines and judicial enforcement: Trouble in Paradise
Brazil's health-care programme strongly hinges on three principles of, right to health guaranteed under the constitution, establishment of HIV/AIDS programme, and last but not least a dynamic TRIPS compliant patent law that facilitates the domestic production and purchase of generics for its health services. In the absence of any of the aforementioned, the health-care programme is bound to fail. With a population of over 190 million and with one of the largest pharmaceutical markets in the world, Brazil spent more than US$17 billion on medicines in 2009. 191 Despite the above, the general population's access to health services and the quality of such services varies according to geography, income, and government resources. 192 The populations can also be classified under three heads based on income groups, with the top earners forming only 15% of the population yet consuming close to half of the pharmaceuticals sold in Brazil, and the poorest making for 51% of the population but yet consuming a meagre 16% of the pharmaceuticals sold in Brazil. 193 art. Likewise inventive step is identified in Article 14, and industrial application in Article 15. Apart from the above, Article 24 requires any application for a patent of invention or utility model to be thoroughly described, so as to allow its reproduction by one skilled in the art. 192 Cohen and Lybecker (n 88) 215. The authors also mention that the nearly 74% of the population, who are the clients of the SUS, are also the ones who cannot afford to pay for a private medical care. 193 Cohen and Lybecker (n 90) 216.
The middle income groups make for 34% of the population and purchase around 36% of all pharmaceuticals sold. 194 The HIV/AIDS programme introduced in Brazil was a success to begin with, but strains were felt due to the uneven pace between the emergence of new pharmaceutical products within the health-care system, and the acute need for new front line treatment for patients who were resistant to existing drugs, 195 which was despite the fact that Brazil was able to use the 'national emergency' clause to facilitate local production of ARVs. 196 As medicines became scarce or unavailable under the SUS, many Brazilians were constrained to resort to the courts to enforce their constitutional right to health, with an everincreasing volume of individual right-to-health lawsuits being filed on a daily basis. 197 The dramatic increases in lawsuits over the decade have seen the Federal Health Ministry's spending on court-attained medicines go up exponentially. 198 The first of the lawsuits to be filed was in 1996, where the courts ruled in favour of the claimant/patient. The reliefs sought in the above lawsuits normally focused on a demand for medicines included on the Ministry of Health's supply list but not available, medicines not on the list due to high costs, and medicines that have not yet been established as safe and effective under the health-care system. 199 Invariably, in all the cases the Brazilian courts were inclined to grant the relief claimed and order the State to provide the medicines sought, as the then prevailing judicial consensus was that a denial of medicine was a violation of the constitutional right to health and access to medicines. 200 The Brazilian courts, including the Supreme Federal Tribunal or, Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), consider the right to health as an individual entitlement to the satisfaction of all of one's health needs with the most advanced treatment available, regardless of the cost implications to the system. 201 The decisions handed down by the STF portray the judiciary as a powerful tool for protecting the constitutional right to health, and in the Court's understanding of its role, such lawsuits protect citizens against government irresponsibility and omission in regards to health issues. 202 invariably grant the relief sought for in the claims does not take into account the economic constraints of the Brazilian system to deliver universal health. 204 Most cases that have reached the STF relate to anti-HIV treatment, followed by phenylketonuria, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, and cancer treatment. 205 In February and March 2007, the STF delivered two decisions, denying claims for access to medicines. The then President of the STF, Ellen Gracie, was quoted as saying, … It is my understanding that Article 196 of the Constitution, that assures the right to health, refers mostly to the carrying out of policies that reach the population as a whole, assuring them universal and equal access, and not in individual situations. The responsibility of the State to provide the resources necessary to the health care of its citizens cannot endanger the public health System.
The NGOs and the civil society groups in Brazil reacted strongly to the above two decisions of the STF and advocated a strong right-to-health campaign, while local health officials seized the mood of the judiciary to bring court actions to interrupt medicine provisions previously ordered by the courts. 206 The judicial trend that followed once again demonstrated a change, as in some cases the courts reverted to the earlier pattern of granting claims for access to medicines. 207 The key driving force behind the ongoing process of implementing the policy of free access to ARVs in Brazil is down to the support this policy received from civil society groups and NGOs who have mounted a ceaseless campaign all along, which has also to a greater degree helped to maintain pressure on the courts in Brazil to consistently grant judicial orders for claims seeking access to medicines as a constitutional right.
3.4.1. Brazil's balancing act: the current state of play and proposed changes Brazil's vision and implementation of constitutional right to health and access to medicine, and its HIV/AIDS programme is commendable. It had held steadfastly to its stance amidst external pressure from developed countries and transnational pharmaceutical corporations to deliver its commitment to right to health, access to medicine and anti-AIDS programme. In the face of opposition it had successfully manoeuvred through the troubled waters of generic medicines and international IP rights enforcement regime to make medicines affordable to its citizens. While all these actions are laudable, one cannot fail to notice that Brazil acted hastily in its implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities, which proved to be costly. Although it managed to recover, it did not fully implement the flexibilities. For instance, it did not introduce any clear legislation to prevent/check the practice of deny some petitions recognising public resource limitations, administrative funding allocations, etc., whereas precedent from earlier STF decisions demonstrated an understanding of budgetary considerations as a 'secondary governmental interest' and of 'minor importance' in the grant of any relief. 204 Ferraz (n 201) . 205 Rosina, Wang and de Campos (n 75) 109. 206 Rosina, Wang and de Campos (n 75) 111. 207 Rosina, Wang and de Campos (n 75) 111. The authors note that from mid-2007 onwards some decisions of the STF had continued with the new approach, while others follow the pre-2007 traditional approach, demonstrating a lack of predictability in such matters. See also Biehl and others (n 191), where the authors note that 815 cases out of the 917 cases that had reached a state high court received a favourable ruling for the plaintiff (either partial or full provision of drugs), which represents a success rate of 89%. patent evergreening by transnational pharmaceutical corporations. This is one area where Brazil will benefit by carrying out more work, as transnational pharmaceutical corporations are notorious in their practice of evergreening and are known to take advantage of the TRIPS Agreement to seek extended patent protection in fast growing pharmaceutical markets like Brazil, India, Thailand, Vietnam, and South Africa. While it can be argued that second-and subsequent-use medical patent is hardly ever granted in Brazil due to the 'prior consent' process and the involvement of ANVISA in the examination of pharmaceutical patent applications, it still lacks in not having a legislative framework which is capable of laying down clear laws to protect the Brazilian jurisdiction from the abuse of patent evergreening. In other words, the protection offered against such practices is only procedural and not explicit in law. Brazil will benefit from the introduction of similar provisions as s.3(d) of the Indian Patent Act to counter the threat of the practice of evergreening.
That apart, one will also have to look at the track record of Brazilian courts in dealing with such cases challenging the decisions of ANVISA in rejecting pharmaceutical patent applications on the grounds of second and subsequent medical use. Clearly defining the role of ANVISA will go a long way in the establishment of a reliable mechanism for scrutiny of pharmaceutical patent applications. Also, a number of suits were filed in Brazil, particularly from the southern and south eastern parts of Brazil, seeking the courts directive to access medicines. The STF's decision, which used to be consistent, started to show a change in the approach from the beginning of 2007, as it came under severe pressure from both civil society groups and local health officials. The judicial trend, which was discussed in the earlier section, still remains a cause for concern as the decisions handed down by the STF are not consistent, giving rise to speculations on judicial outcomes. To be able to successfully implement policies and laws, a nation needs to boast of a robust and independent judiciary which will not be fazed by external pressure and be able to pronounce the law in the light of its true purport in the pursuit of justice. In 2013, the Brazilian government announced proposals for change to its LPIs, and the same is analysed in the next section.
3.4.1.1. Changing landscape and the proposed changes to patent laws. In December 2013, a key administrative change at the INPI was announced, which means that one of the long-serving commissioners will be replaced by a career diplomat, who is branded as holding strong views about the patent system, and in particular towards pharmaceutical patents. 208 The new commissioner has already welcomed and supported the new bill (5.402/2013), which proposes extensive changes to the 1992 LPIs. 209 The changes proposed are clearly influenced by the Indian Patent Act 2005, in seeking to lower the level of patent protection and at the same time raising the bar on patentability. On 9 October 2013, the Brazilian Parliamentary Committee released the proposals for change to its 208 W New, 'Brazil Takes Steps Aimed at More Balanced IP Rights', Intellectual Property Watch (13 December 2013) <http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/12/13/brazil-takes-steps-aimed-at-more-balancedip-rights/> accessed 9 April 2014. Otavio Brandelli, the incoming commissioner, is seen by many as an advocate for the 'agenda for development' that Brazil presented with Argentina at the WIPO. The author quoting Allan Rocha de Souza (cultural policy professor at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) opines that this appointment signals that Brazilian internal and foreign policies on patents will finally be bridged, as the new commissioner Brandelli has a good foreign affairs experience. 209 LPIs in a report entitled 'Brazil's Patent Reform: Innovation Towards National Competitiveness.' 210 The reforms include eliminating patent term extensions and data exclusivity, restricting patents on new forms and second and subsequent use pharmaceutical inventions, increasing the standard for inventive step, 211 and also clarify the role Brazil's drug regulatory agency (ANVISA), besides strengthening its prior approval powers to deny pharmaceutical patents. Article 2 of Bill HR 5042/2013 restricts patent protection to a 20-year period and seeks to scrap Article 40 of Lei 92790/1996, which grants patent protection beyond 20 years where the time taken for granting a patent exceed 10 years. This is a TRIPS compliant provision, as Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement does not envisage grant of patent beyond a period of 20 years starting from the date of filing, and any further extension of patent beyond the period mentioned in Article 33 is a 'TRIPS-plus' measure. 212 The next important reform proposed is found under Article 3 of the above bill, which seeks to amend Article 10 (X) and (XI) to exclude certain items from patentable subject matters, and runs as follows:
Art. 10. [The following are not considered to be inventions or utility models:] (X) any new property or new use of a known substance, or the mere use of a known process, unless this known process results in a new product; (XI) new forms of known substances that do not result in an improvement in the known efficacy of the substance. For the purposes of this Article, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, size of particles, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations, and other derivatives of a known substance shall be considered the same substance, unless they significantly differ in terms of properties regarding efficacy.
The proposal in Article 3 is strikingly similar to s.3(d) of the Indian Patent Act 2005, which has come under severe attack and criticism from transnational pharmaceutical corporations and also from the United States Trade Representative (USTR), as it is a measure introduced by the Indian legislature to counter the practice of evergreening. 213 corporations to extend the lifetime of patents on the basis of minor or trivial changes to a known substance or on the basis of easily discovered new uses of existing substances. The 'efficacy' standard suggests that there may be an inventive step worth patenting if the product shows significant or dramatic improvement in therapeutic efficacy. 214 The number of patents granted in Brazil from 2000 to 2011 to overseas interests stand at 197,272 (69%) as opposed to 88,096 to domestic interest (31%). 215 The proposal to increase the standard of inventive step through Article 3 of the bill by amending Article 31 will strengthen the patent system, and together with the introduction of changes to second-and subsequent-use pharmaceutical patents see a well-protected patent regime immune to pharmaceutical patent abuse by transnational patented holders and also less applications from overseas patent interests. The changes mooted are similar to s.2(ja) of the Indian Patent Act, and the report also refers to steps taken by other jurisdictions, namely the USA, to tighten up the inventive step analysis to avoid granting of 20-year monopolies on minor or trivial advances in the art. 216 The proposal to clarify the institutional structure and authority of ANVISA, especially relating to examination of pharmaceutical patents by INPI and ANVISA under the prior consent system will strengthen institutional credibility of the patent office. One can see the direction in which the Brazilian government wants to go in this regard, as it has started collaborating with other developing countries and sharing valuable experience in dealing with instances of evergreening and exploitation of patent regimes by transnational corporations (TNCs).
Conclusion
A year after the establishment of the WTO, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS was established, 217 as the HIV/AIDS epidemic that had spread across the globe at an alarming rate was posing further threats, as the most affected regions in the developing countries and LDCs, as opposed to developed countries, were only seeing an increase in numbers. 218 When Brazil implemented TRIPS compliant patent legislation into its laws it already had in place a policy of universal access to ARV treatment following the HIV/ AIDS epidemic that gripped the country in the mid-1980s. The above policies read with the constitution right to health guaranteed under the 1988 Constitution meant that the government had a herculean task at hand, which was the production of affordable medicine, or in other words generics, to honour its commitments. Unfortunately, Brazil went ahead with the implementation of the TRIPS legislation in a hurry without utilising the time-bound flexibilities afforded under the TRIPS Agreement. This saw Brazil finding itself in a very difficult situation. 219 But, what it had proved since then is commendable, as it has seen a decrease in mortality rates between 1997 and 2004, which continues to decrease, and also reduction in morbidity from 1993 to 2003. It had also seen a reduction in the rate of hospitalisations, which has in turn generated a cost saving of close to US$2.3 billion. These figures demonstrate that access to proper ARV treatment in Brazil over the past 10 years has substantially transformed the lives of patients and the methods of controlling HIV infection, improving quality of life for people living with AIDS, increasing their life expectancy, reduction in the transmissibility of the virus, and thereby causing a significant decline in mortality rates. 220 Brazil, in its pursuit of universal health to its citizens has followed a pattern of bold policy decisions backed up by legislation and the creation of appropriate institutional mechanism to implement such policies. The changes proposed to the LPI in 2013, and likely to be taken up for discussion in 2014, is encouraging as they appear to address the shortcomings of some of the provisions of the current laws, for example, the practice of seeking patent protection for second-and subsequent-use medical use, or evergreening. This area still remains a concern for Brazil's LPI, as it not only currently lack necessary legislation to check such practices, but also has a peculiar system of 'double scrutiny' of pharmaceutical applications by the INPI and ANVISA, referred to as prior consent system, which has created a huge 10-year backlog. Working closely with civil society groups and NGOs, Brazil has managed, so far, to ward off external pressure from transnational pharmaceutical corporations and the USA, which had used its super 301 221 and the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism against it, and successfully continued with the implementation of its much acclaimed anti-AIDS programme. If one were to look closely at the time line from the outbreak of the AIDS in the 1980s in Brazil up to the point of the TRIPS implementation, it can be observed that all measures taken by Brazil had been within the international legal framework, and clearly TRIPS compliant. The TRIPS Agreement only recognises IP right as a private right, so that any prosecution to 219 S Ganji, 'TRIPS Implementation and Strategic Health Policy in India and Brazil' (2011) 3 Joseph Korbel J Advanced Intl St 29-57. The author observes that in implementing the TRIPS Agreement, India reacted to Western pressures by implementing the agreement in a gradual fashion, whereas Brazil enacted the Agreement in a hurried fashion. As a result, India's legal system was better positioned to deal with new global patent laws than Brazil's, which instead exercised its own brand of economic coercion (threat or use of compulsory licencing) to retrieve ground previously lost when it first ratified the TRIPS Agreement. 220 Chaves, Vieira and Reis (n 129) 171. 221 The USTR cites powers granted to ANVISA to review pharmaceutical patent applications for meeting patentability requirements, which regulations according to the USTR appear to contravene an earlier opinion of the Federal Attorney General that ANVISA did not have the authority, as the primary reason in its 2013 report to keep Brazil on its 'watch list' of countries whose IP regimes are of concern. The USA has, year after year, identified the authority granted to ANVISA as one of the reasons for having Brazil in its Special 301 watch list. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Special 301 Reports 1989-2014 (USTR, Washington, DC 2014) <http://www.keionline.org/ ustr/special301> accessed 16 April 2014. The USTR has a 'priority watch list' and a 'watch list' to monitor countries around the world in their implementation of IP rights. Brazil was in the 'priority watch list' for a number of years before being put on the slightly lesser category of 'watch list.' India, another developing country, which used the TRIPS flexibilities to introduce s.3(d) into its patent legislation to check the practice of patent evergreening, has been put on the 'priority watch list.' The USTR identifies the decision taken by the IP Appellate Board (and confirmed by the Supreme Court of India) as one of the main reasons for putting India on the 'priority watch list.' be launched against possible violations of IP rights are only brought by rights holders. But in practice this does not seem to be the case, as the rights holders of pharmaceutical corporations lobby their national governments to act on their behalf, 222 to either exert pressure on such national governments seeking changes or use the TRIPS-plus route to increase the level of patent protection. This is achieved through the incorporation of TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs, which are bilateral agreements as opposed to the multilateral agreements of the WTO.
Brazil's use of the compulsory licence provision is to be commended, as it was able to use the threat of granting a compulsory licence to its advantage most effectively in price negotiations with transnational pharmaceutical corporations, 223 which has resulted in enormous savings for its anti-AIDS programme and for the SUS. 224 Besides, it has also issued compulsory licence when negotiations with the rights holder failed. 225 On the one hand, it has used the threat as a bargaining chip, when negotiations failed it has actually invoked the provision to access affordable medicines for its health-care system. But then again, Brazil came under severe pressure from the USA, as it launched a dispute before the WTO on the grounds that the Brazilian patent law provisions in this regard were not consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. 226 The use of the compulsory licensing provision by Brazil demonstrates both a hesitation in implementation, and a willingness to engage in negotiations before implementation. A developing country, which has the flexibilities incorporated in the TRIPS Agreements for its benefit, should be able to use it for achieving its objectives without the fear of being pressurised by developed countries, or for that matter rightsholding transnational pharmaceutical corporations. The sufferers are both the patients who rely upon their health-care systems and the developing countries administering them. A study carried out by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) points out that the minimum standards of protection for IP rights to be provided by each WTO Member under the TRIPS Agreement were modelled on western legal practice and are set at a level comparable to those in the developed countries and are controversial, as there is an asymmetry in the level of development and research capacities between the North and South. 227 As mentioned earlier, after signing of the TRIPS Agreement, most developing countries were in for a rude shock as the trade-off agreed between the developed and developing countries did not materialise. 228 The standards identified under the TRIPS Agreement are not achievable in most developing countries even in the medium term, and the same to have been implemented through a covered Agreement of the WTO, i.e. the TRIPS Agreement, had seen the developing countries wilt under the pressure of a WTO obligation. It is only fair to say that both developing countries and LDCs were not ready to embrace an international IP rights regime when introduced in 1995 through the TRIPS Agreement. The worldwide statistics on patents demonstrate a dominance of developed economies in IP ownership, which dominance does not stop at the domestic level. Most patents issued in developing countries are filed by overseas interests originating from developed countries and are the property of a relatively few transnational interests. 229 In most developing countries, there is strong suspicion that the TRIPS Agreement is a vehicle of a policy of 'technological protectionism' more intended at consolidating an international division of labour where the industrialised nations generate innovations and developing countries are the market for the resulting products. 230 The well-documented TRIPS negotiation process demonstrates that a level playing field was visibly absent during negotiations as most developing countries and LDCs either did not have the necessary knowledge economy, or the infrastructure for implementing a high standard of IP rights protection, 231 and in many cases both factors were absent and hence were incapable of actually giving effect to the TRIPS Agreement into their domestic legislation. The next point that strikes us on an analysis of Brazil's patent laws 232 and the health-care policies is the fundamental flaw of allowing developed nations to negotiate private rights (IP rights) with access to affordable medicine, which has resulted in developing nations being dragged to the WTO, or harassed by seizure of in-transit-generic medicines destined for developing countries.
Having examined the proposed changes to the LPIs in Brazil, the transnational pharmaceutical patent holders and developed countries await the passing of new LPIs in 2014. As discussed, the changes proposed are unquestionably TRIPS compliant and will be beneficial to protect its jurisdiction from the abuse of patent evergreening. The new laws could potentially see the tightening up of the patent protection mechanism and could also see interference in its implementation from pharmaceutical patent holders, as it does not bode well for the practice of evergreening. Brazil reinvented itself when it came out of over two decades of military rule to make its mark in the international arena as a big player, while bravely implementing health policies through its constitutional right to health and ably do battle against the scourge of HIV/AIDS. It did find itself in troubled waters with an early implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. But ever since, it had fought demons within and without to maintain its commitment to the constitutional right 228 Dreyfuss (n 39). . 231 Dreyfuss (n 39). 232 An analysis of the pharmaceutical patent laws of India, South Africa and Thailand (all categorised as developing countries) will likely lead one to raise similar points or conclusions, as these three jurisdictions have found the going extremely tough to see the implementation of flexibilities, with constant interference from both developed nations and transnational pharmaceutical patent holding interests.
to health and access to medicines, and anti-AIDS campaign through the use of generics medicines and its TRIPS compliant LPI. The proposed changes to its LPI, if implemented, will only see it strengthening its position. As seen in the case of India, when implementing the TRIPS compliant patent laws in 2005, Brazil can expect such external pressure in its implementation of the proposed new laws relating to industrial property.
